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The Surprising Views of Montesquieu and 
Tocqueville about Juries: Juries Empower Judges 
Renée Lettow Lerner*1 
ABSTRACT 
 
Both Montesquieu and Tocqueville thought that an independent 
judiciary was key to maintaining a moderate government of ordered 
liberty. But judicial power should not be exercised too openly, or the 
people would view judges as tyrannical. In Montesquieu’s and 
Tocqueville’s view, the jury was an excellent mask for the power of 
judges. Both Montesquieu and Tocqueville thought that popular juries had 
many weaknesses in deciding cases. But, as Tocqueville made clear, the 
firm guidance of the judge in instructions on law and comments on 
evidence could prevent juries from going astray and make the institution a 
“free school” for democracy. 
The Article explores Montesquieu’s legacy concerning judges and 
juries in the arguments of both the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists. It 
also examines the American antecedents of Tocqueville’s idea of the jury 
as a school for democracy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
We American legal professionals think we know about Montesquieu 
and Tocqueville. Or, at least, we think we know enough. Montesquieu 
developed the three-fold separation of powers embodied in the structure 
of the U.S. Constitution and the federal government.2 He also supported 
use of lay juries.3 Tocqueville wrote that the jury is a school for 
democracy.4 He also quipped that, in America, sooner or later, almost 
every political question becomes a judicial question.5 The vast majority of 
us stop there and call it a day, without bothering actually to read them, or, 
if we do, only in tiny, isolated, and easily digested snippets. 
 
 2. CHARLES DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE 
LAWS 156–57 (bk. 11, ch. 6) (Anne M. Cohler, Basia Carolyn Miller & Harold 
Samuel Stone trans. & eds., 1989) (1748). 
 3. Id. at 158. 
 4. 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 275 (J.P. Mayer 
ed., George Lawrence trans., 1969) (1835). 
 5. Id. at 270. 




That is a mistake. These men were deep and influential thinkers. 
Americans have too often found in Montesquieu and Tocqueville what 
they wanted to find, not what is actually there. And of no topic is that more 
true than the jury. 
My own rude awakening came first about Tocqueville. I am writing a 
book about the history of the civil jury in America. During my research, I 
have come across scores of quotations of and paraphrases from 
Tocqueville by American lawyers, judges, legal academics, and politicians 
that the jury is a vital institution because it is a school for democracy. 
These references began in the 1840s, soon after the publication of the first 
American edition of Democracy in America in 1838.6 They have continued 
without a break to the present.7 Having encountered so many of these 
references to Tocqueville, I figured it was time to read him carefully 
myself. 
When I did, I was stunned. Tocqueville was not praising the jury at 
all. At least, he was not praising the jury for anything that seemed familiar. 
Tocqueville was praising the jury because the institution amplified the 
influence of judges. 
Shaken by that revelation, I turned to work on another book. The other 
book is a condensed but sweeping account of the jury across time and the 
globe. It was time now to be systematic, I thought, in describing the 
purposes of the jury. I knew that Montesquieu praised the use of juries. I 
also knew that he greatly influenced the American founders and the French 
revolutionaries who introduced trial by jury to France in criminal cases.8 
 
 6. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (John C. Spencer 
ed., Henry Reeve trans., 1838) (1835). 
 7. See, e.g., Flint River Steamboat Co. v. Foster, 5 Ga. 194, 205–06 (1848) 
(Joseph Lumpkin, C.J.); AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND 
RECONSTRUCTION 93 (1998); Nancy S. Marder, The Jury as a ‘Free School’ for 
Democracy, 5 INSIGHTS ON L. & SOC’Y 4, 4–6 (2005); Sheldon Whitehouse, 
Restoring the Civil Jury’s Role in the Structure of Our Government, 55 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1241, 1268–69 (2014). Judges have also frequently quoted 
Tocqueville’s characterization of the jury as a form of direct democracy. See, e.g., 
William G. Young, Vanishing Trials, Vanishing Juries, Vanishing Constitution, 
40 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 67, 71 (2006). 
 8. See, e.g., JAMES M. DONOVAN, JURIES AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN FRANCE IN THE NINETEENTH AND TWENTIETH CENTURIES 
28, 31 (2010); ADHÉMAR ESMEIN, A HISTORY OF CONTINENTAL CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE 416 (John Simpson trans., 1914) (1882). Esmein explained that 
Montesquieu especially influenced the French revolutionaries by his insistence 
that the jury could only decide one fact. See infra text accompanying note 49. This 
led the revolutionaries to decree that juries should only be presented with 
questions about facts, essentially in the form of a special verdict. 




During the nineteenth century, the institution of the criminal jury spread 
to other parts of Europe, particularly as governments made concessions to 
liberals after the revolutions of 1848. France’s jury practice, influenced by 
Montesquieu, was the initial European model.9 Montesquieu also 
influenced early nineteenth-century Latin American liberals, who 
introduced rights to jury trial after countries declared independence from 
Spain and Portugal.10 In Montesquieu, I thought, I would get insight into 
the attraction of the institution beyond the common-law world. With some 
trepidation, because I was aware that Montesquieu can be obscure, I 
opened the Spirit of the Laws. 
Once again, I was astounded. Montesquieu was not praising the jury 
for anything that seemed familiar. He advocated use of juries because the 
institution masked the power of judges. 
My first thought was that this could not be a coincidence. While 
Tocqueville was writing Democracy in America, he told his cousin and 
close friend that there were “three men with whom I commune a bit every 
day, Pascal, Montesquieu, and Rousseau.”11 
My second thought was that I could not be the first person to have 
noticed this. Montesquieu and Tocqueville are major thinkers and have 
been much studied. Someone must have seen that they valued juries 
mainly for how the institution protected and augmented the power of 
judges. 
I found that almost no one has remarked on this distinctive feature of 
Montesquieu’s work. Many scholars, French and otherwise, have treated 
Montesquieu’s views of judges and juries as simply typical of eighteenth-
century enlightenment views. They have indiscriminately lumped his 
 
 9. See Gerhard Casper & Hans Zeisel, Lay Judges in the German Criminal 
Courts, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 135, 136–38 (l972). Caspar and Zeisel explained that 
most of the German states borrowed the French practice of the special verdict. Id. 
at 137–38. 
 10. On the influence of Montesquieu and French liberals on Mexican liberals 
in the 1820s, and the introduction of jury trial in Mexico, see Charles A. Hale, 
José María Luis Mora and the Structure of Mexican Liberalism, 45 HISPANIC AM. 
HIST. REV. 196, 200–02 (1965); Hiroshi Fukurai, Clark R. Knudtson & Susan I. 
Lopez, Is Mexico Ready for a Jury Trial? Comparative Analysis of Lay Justice 
Systems in Mexico, the United States, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, and 
Ireland, 2 MEXICAN L. REV. 3, 12 (2009). 
 11. Alexis de Tocqueville, Letter to Louis de Kergorlay, 10 November 1836, 
in 13 OEUVRES COMPLÈTES 148 (J.P. Mayer ed., 1951). On this triad, see PAUL O. 
CARRESE, DEMOCRACY IN MODERATION: MONTESQUIEU, TOCQUEVILLE, AND 
SUSTAINABLE LIBERALISM 85–86 (2016). 




thinking on these topics with, for example, that of Voltaire and Beccaria.12 
Some scholars have found in Montesquieu a more distinctive teaching 
about judges and judicial independence.13 The work of American political 
scientist James Stoner is especially instructive.14 
Then I discovered the work of Paul Carrese, in particular his 2003 
book The Cloaking of Power: Montesquieu, Blackstone, and the Rise of 
Judicial Activism. Carrese had seen that Montesquieu put judges and 
judging at the center of his political ideas for protecting liberty.15 He also 
had seen that Montesquieu recommended using lay juries in order to mask 
the power of the judges.16 
Carrese studies political philosophy. He is not a lawyer or legal 
academic. This particular training, and lack of training, most likely 
encouraged him to see what lawyers and legal academics have failed to 
see. He makes profound observations about law and the place of judges in 
government. He has drawn important connections between Montesquieu, 
Blackstone, Hamilton, and Tocqueville. 
But Carrese’s training in political philosophy also means that he is less 
interested in, and knowledgeable about, a part of the legal system that legal 
professionals are deeply concerned with: the process of adjudication. 
Montesquieu, Blackstone, Hamilton, and Tocqueville were all legal 
professionals, and closely concerned with adjudication. As a legal 
historian, I am able to delve into the mechanisms that Montesquieu and 
Tocqueville suggest for the exercise of judicial power. I can identify more 
 
 12. See, e.g., ESMEIN, supra note 8, at 359, 362–63, 369; ELIE CARCASSONNE, 
MONTESQUIEU ET LE PROBLÈME DE LA CONSTITUTION FRANÇAISE AU XVIII 
SIÈCLE Chs. 4–6 (1927); FRANKLIN L. FORD, ROBE AND SWORD: THE 
REGROUPING OF THE FRENCH ARISTOCRACY AFTER LOUIS XIV 238–45 (1953). 
 13. Simone Goyard-Fabre, Le Réformisme de Montesquieu: Progrès 
juridique et histoire, in LA PENSÉE POLITIQUE DE MONTESQUIEU: CAHIERS DE 
PHILOSOPHIE POLITIQUE ET JURIDIQUE DE L’UNIVERSITÉ DE CAEN 66–67 (1985); 
LOUIS ALTHUSSER, MONTESQUIEU: LA POLITIQUE ET L’HISTOIRE 98–103 (1959); 
JUDITH SHKLAR, MONTESQUIEU 81, 88–91, 113, 124–25 (1987); René Cassin, 
Montesquieu et la protection juridictionelle des libertés, in ACTES DU CONGRÈS 
MONTESQUIEU 249–56 (Louis Desgraves ed., 1956); Georges Vlachos, Le 
Pouvoir judiciaire dans L’Esprit des lois, in PROBLÈMES DE DROIT PUBLIC 
CONTEMPORAIN: MÉLANGES EN L’HONNEUR DU PROFESSEUR MICHEL 
STASSINOPOULOS (1974). 
 14. JAMES R. STONER, JR., COMMON LAW AND LIBERAL THEORY: COKE, 
HOBBES, AND THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 154, 158 (1992). 
 15. PAUL O. CARRESE, THE CLOAKING OF POWER: MONTESQUIEU, 
BLACKSTONE, AND THE RISE OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 16–17 (2003). 
 16. Id. at 49–50. 




clearly their criticisms of the use of lay juries. I am also able to evaluate 
their ideas in light of the history of legal systems. 
Briefly, my argument is this: Montesquieu and Tocqueville could see 
the appeal of popular government. Both set liberty as the highest goal that 
government could achieve. They saw that popular government could lead 
to abuses and curtailments of liberty. Democracies and republics could 
easily descend into tyranny. For Montesquieu and Tocqueville, one of the 
central questions was how to incorporate popular participation in 
government while tempering its excesses and preserving liberty. The main 
answer they both gave was professional judges. An independent judiciary, 
they thought, should focus on the rights of the individual and shield 
individuals from tyranny. Such a judiciary would be an aristocratic, 
moderating element in a republic. 
But the judiciary must be careful in how it exercises this moderating 
power. It must not exercise power too openly. If it did, then the people 
would start to resent the judiciary as yet another tyrannical power. Judicial 
power, to be effective, must be masked. There were different ways to do 
this masking. One important way was to use juries. 
For Montesquieu and Tocqueville, then, the main point of juries was 
to mask judicial power. In their view, the primary purpose of juries was 
not one of the standard justifications given by common-law lawyers and 
judges: to provide direct popular participation in government, to render 
more accurate decisions, or to counteract the biases of judges. Those goals 
could be achieved by other means. But juries were a wonderful way of 
deflecting attention and responsibility from judges. The judges could 
claim that they were simply handing a case to a group of laypeople. The 
result was not the judges’ fault, not their responsibility. 
Meanwhile, of course, judges were supposed to exercise considerable 
power in less obvious ways. Montesquieu seems to have assumed the 
English practice of the judge giving firm guidance to the jury through 
instructions on law and, even more importantly, comment on the 
evidence.17 Tocqueville was more open in describing and praising this 
practice. In Tocqueville’s view, judges should gently but authoritatively 
guide jurors to a proper understanding of law and facts. According to 
Tocqueville, the main point of jurors’ education in the “free school” for 
democracy was to learn to defer to a more competent authority—the 
judge.18 
Along the way, I discuss Montesquieu’s influence on the American 
founding. Both the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists drew on his work, 
 
 17. See infra Part I.E. 
 18. See infra Part II.B. 




but reached different conclusions about the need to constrain judges and 
the role of the jury. The Anti-Federalists worried that the U.S. Constitution 
provided no check on the federal judiciary. They thought that rights to jury 
trial should be expanded so that the jury could serve as such a check. In 
his response, Alexander Hamilton was especially Montesquieuian. He 
commended juries, at least in criminal cases, but he advocated a judicial 
power beyond what even Montesquieu may have thought advisable.19 
I also shed new light on the antecedents of Tocqueville’s idea of the 
jury as a school. With the advent of a modern democratic regime, the 
education of large numbers of citizens in self-governance became critical. 
Already before Tocqueville arrived, Americans were developing the 
concept of the jury as a school. But Tocqueville made clearer the vital role 
of the judge as teacher and guide. 
At the end, I offer thoughts about whether Montesquieu and 
Tocqueville were accurate in their belief in the potential of juries to mask 
judicial power. I also briefly consider the question of whether the 
considerable costs that the jury imposes on the legal system, in many ways, 
are worth the benefit that Montesquieu and Tocqueville suggest. Both of 
these authors anticipated this question. That is not surprising. They were 
both judges, and they were both judges in an inquisitorial system, so able 
to take a clearer view of the subject than a common-law judge. They did 
not take juries for granted, nor did they try to justify the institution simply 
because it existed, was old, and had been praised by others. Both of them 
recognized and described many of the weaknesses of juries. 
I. MONTESQUIEU ON JUDGES AND JURIES 
A. Montesquieu’s Position as a Judge, His Stay in England, and Spirit of 
the Laws 
Charles-Louis de Secondat, baron de La Brède et de Montesquieu 
(1689–1755), became a high-ranking judge in ancien régime France in the 
usual way: he inherited the job. When his uncle died in 1716, Montesquieu 
inherited his title and judicial office in the Parlement of Bordeaux. The 
French parlements were not, like the cognate English Parliament, 
legislatures. Rather, they were judicial and administrative bodies. For the 
next decade, Montesquieu presided over the Parlement of Bordeaux’s 
criminal division. The criminal division heard appeals, supervised prisons, 
and administered punishments.20 In thinking about Montesquieu’s work as 
 
 19. See infra Part II.D.1–2. 
 20. REBECCA KINGSTON, MONTESQUIEU AND THE PARLEMENT OF 
BORDEAUX 219–71 (1996). 




an appellate judge, it is important to remember that appeals were and are 
much more thorough in inquisitorial systems than in common-law 
systems. Appeals in inquisitorial systems involve a thorough review of an 
extensive written record and concern questions of fact as well as law. The 
truncated appeals in common-law systems are the result of using lay 
juries.21 
Montesquieu’s interests turned to literary and intellectual life. In 1725, 
he sold his judicial office, a common practice, and resigned from the 
Parlement. He travelled to Italy, Germany, Austria, and other places, 
finally ending up in England, where he lived for two years.22 The English 
political system made an enormous impression on him. At the time, 
England was developing a new constitution in the wake of the Glorious 
Revolution of 1688 to 1689. Key features of that new constitution were 
the supremacy of Parliament over royal prerogative and the independence 
of judges. The Act of Settlement of 1701 ensured that English judges could 
serve during their good behavior, not at the pleasure of the Crown.23 
Afflicted by failing eyesight, Montesquieu returned to France and 
began writing his culminating work Spirit of the Laws. He finally 
published the book anonymously in 1748 in Geneva, where controls on 
the press were less strict than in France. Even so, Montesquieu was careful 
not to make his meaning too plain. A book openly singing the praises of 
liberty would attract official ire. Often Montesquieu must be read between 
the lines, in effect esoterically. Montesquieu essentially asked for an 
esoteric reading of his book when he emphasized that the book must be 
read as a whole.24 In the preface, he urged that his reader “not judge by a 
moment’s reading the work of twenty years, that one approve or condemn 
the book as a whole and not some few sentences.”25 He further explained 
 
 21. 1 JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF 
ENGLAND 309, 568–69 (1883); John H. Langbein, Bifurcation and the Bench: The 
Influence of the Jury on English Conceptions of the Judiciary, in JUDGES AND 
JUDGING IN THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW AND CIVIL LAW: FROM 
ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 67, 70 & n.17 (Paul Brand & Joshua Getzler eds., 
2012). 
 22. ROBERT SHACKLETON, MONTESQUIEU: A CRITICAL BIOGRAPHY 90–145 
(1961). 
 23. 12 and 13 Will. 3 c. 2. 
 24. THOMAS L. PANGLE, MONTESQUIEU'S PHILOSOPHY OF LIBERALISM: A 
COMMENTARY ON THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 11–19 (1989). As Nelson Lund put it, 
anyone who tries to summarize Spirit of the Laws performs “a hazardous act of 
distillation.” Nelson Lund, Montesquieu, Judicial Degeneracy, and the U.S. 
Supreme Court, in NATURAL MORAL LAW IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 285, 298 
(Holger Zaborowski ed., 2010). 
 25. MONTESQUIEU, SPIRIT OF THE LAWS, supra note 2, at xliii (Preface). 




that “one must not always so exhaust a subject that one leaves nothing for 
the reader to do,” and that he wanted the reader not just to read but to 
“think.”26 Despite Montesquieu’s precautions, in 1751 the Vatican put 
Spirit of the Laws on its Index of Forbidden Books. The eighteenth-century 
censors at the Vatican understood his meaning well enough. 
In Spirit of the Laws, Montesquieu quietly sang the praises of liberty. 
He thought that strenuous efforts to incorporate morality into law and 
politics were themselves likely to lead to tyranny, as in Cromwell’s 
England.27 Montesquieu was one of the major architects of the modern 
project of lowering the aims of government—from justice and moral 
excellence, as in the ancient polities, to contented self-preservation and 
individual liberty.28 
In his book, Montesquieu offered several different definitions of 
liberty.29 Montesquieu might thereby have been suggesting that the 
concept, and perhaps enjoyment, of liberty is elusive. Liberty may require 
a certain tempering or moderation of the mind, even in formulating the 
idea. In any event, at the beginning of his famous chapter on the 
constitution of England, Montesquieu gave a definition of political liberty. 
“Political liberty,” that most desired state of government, “is that 
tranquility of spirit which comes from the opinion each one has of his 
security, and in order for him to have this liberty the government must be 
such that one citizen cannot fear another citizen.”30 No one person, or set 
of persons, should dominate the others. 
In the ancient and medieval world, it was hoped that justice, including 
lack of oppression, would be achieved by the mixed regime.31 In this world 
view, society was deeply divided between different classes: the few 
(oligarchs or the aristocracy) and the many (the common people). In the 
ruling institutions, it was necessary to provide separate representation for 
each of the classes, and for each class to have a veto over the other. 
Otherwise one class would oppress the other. An example of the mixed 
 
 26. Id. at 186 (bk. 11, ch. 20). 
 27. Id. at 75 n.2 (bk. 6, ch. 2). 
 28. Any striving for excellence should occur in the private sphere. 
Montesquieu’s predecessors in the effort to lower the aims of government were 
Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Locke. LEO STRAUSS, NATURAL RIGHT AND HISTORY 
177–184, 226–34 (1953); Martin Diamond, The Separation of Powers and the 
Mixed Regime, 8 PUBLIUS 33, 37–39 (1978). 
 29. MONTESQUIEU, SPIRIT OF THE LAWS, supra note 2, at 154–57 (bk. 11, chs. 
1–6); id. at 188 (bk. 12, ch. 2); Lund, supra note 24, at 300–01. 
 30. MONTESQUIEU, SPIRIT OF THE LAWS, supra note 2, at 157 (bk. 11, ch. 6). 
 31. The differences between the ancient mixed regime and the modern 
separation of powers are described in Diamond, supra note 28, at 34–39. 




regime was the English House of Lords and House of Commons. This was 
not the modern separation of powers. Although they represented different 
classes, the two houses of Parliament performed basically similar 
functions. Montesquieu praised the English mixed regime, including a 
hereditary nobility to oppose both a monarch’s pretensions to absolute rule 
and the common people’s desire to confiscate property.32  
But Montesquieu had something in mind beyond the old mixed 
regime. It was not enough to divide the institutions of government by class. 
He thought they should also be divided by function. This insight was so 
influential in part because division by function could readily be applied to 
a type of government that in theory had no privileged classes. That is, to 
democracy. The modern separation of powers does not divide institutions 
by classes, but by functions. Modern separation of powers is intended to 
moderate the effects of a political equality of citizens. 
With the lowering of the aims of government, political equality of 
citizens became a possibility. The concern about democracy had always 
been that the common people were inadequate to the job of politics. But 
perhaps the people would be, or could become, capable enough to achieve 
modest aims.33 As we have seen, one of these modest aims was individual 
liberty. Such liberty would require limits on government power, 
moderation. Therefore Montesquieu’s aim was to produce a moderate 
government. “Political liberty is found only in moderate governments.”34 
Forming a moderate government requires checks and balances, 
including the separation of powers by function. As Montesquieu put it:  
In order to form a moderate government, one must combine 
powers, regulate them, temper them, make them act; one must 
give one power a ballast, so to speak, to put it in a position to resist 
another; this is a masterwork of legislation that chance rarely 
produces and prudence is rarely allowed to produce.35 
 
 32. MONTESQUIEU, SPIRIT OF THE LAWS, supra note 2, at 160–61 (bk. 11, ch. 
6). At least in theory, the two houses of Parliament represented different classes. 
But in practice, this difference could be slight. Into the nineteenth century, the 
English nobility had a large influence on the House of Commons, through “rotten 
boroughs” and other patronage. And the interests of many of the landed gentry in 
the House of Commons were hard to distinguish from the interests of the nobility. 
 33. Diamond, supra note 28, at 39. 
 34. MONTESQUIEU, SPIRIT OF THE LAWS, supra note 2, at 155 (bk. 11, ch. 4). 
 35. Id. at 63 (bk. 5, ch. 14). 




B. Professional Judges: The Key to Preserving Liberty 
Montesquieu’s great innovation was adding the judiciary to the 
legislature and executive to form a triumvirate of governmental power. 
Hobbes gave the Leviathan all power; Locke divided sovereignty into the 
legislative and executive, law-making and law-enforcing.36 For Locke, 
judging fell under the executive. Montesquieu separated the power to 
judge and raised it to be on par with the other powers.37 For liberty to exist, 
Montesquieu wrote, the power of judging must be separate from the other 
two powers: “If it were joined to legislative power, the power over the life 
and liberty of the citizens would be arbitrary, for the judge would be the 
legislator.”38 Similarly, “If it were joined to executive power, the judge 
could have the force of an oppressor.”39 
This third power, the judiciary, was supposed to focus on “civil law,” 
that is, resolution of criminal and civil disputes that directly affect 
individuals. The judiciary was not supposed to focus on “political law” or 
public law.40 By focusing on individual disputes with an eye to liberty, 
judges would be a moderating power that could help prevent tyranny. 
Who were these judges supposed to be? A key quality was that they 
be independent from the other two powers, and from anyone else. In 
Montesquieu’s France, that independence was assured in a way that seems 
odd to us today: many offices, including judicial offices, were treated as 
property—inherited, bought, and sold. As we have seen, Montesquieu 
inherited and sold his own judicial office. Montesquieu thought that that 
practice suited a monarchy.41 In a monarchy such as France, he believed, 
the system combined the best features of a hereditary nobility—its respect 
for custom and desire for stability—with the energy of the newly rich, the 
mercantile class.42 Treating offices as property would produce more 
independence than having to curry favor with the monarch for an 
appointment. But in a republic, Montesquieu suggested, officers should be 
selected based on competence and virtue.43 In any case, in order for 
 
 36. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 364 (Peter Laslett ed., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1689). 
 37. MONTESQUIEU, SPIRIT OF THE LAWS, supra note 2, at 156–57 (bk. 6, ch. 11). 
 38. Id. at 157. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 8 (bk. 1, ch. 3) (defining political law and civil law); id. at 157 (bk. 
11, ch. 6) (noting how the judicial power “punishes crimes or judges disputes 
between individuals”). 
 41. Id. at 70–71 (bk. 5, ch. 19). 
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Montesquieu’s scheme of separation of powers to function properly, 
judges must be independent of the legislative and executive powers. 
How were judges supposed to exercise this independent power? It was 
imperative that judges decide cases according to law. Otherwise, a judge 
would be a despot.44 Montesquieu gave his most thorough account of 
professional judging in the context of monarchies. It seems likely that he 
presented this discussion in that context because he suggested that, in 
republics, the people did the real judging and professional judges had very 
little discretion.45 This claim of lack of discretion in professional judges in 
a republic could help to conceal the aristocratic character of the office and 
its power. In monarchies, Montesquieu explained, judges followed the law 
when it was precise. When the law was not precise, the judges sought its 
spirit.46 This could be a delicate business. In deciding particular cases, 
“judges assume the manner of arbitrators; they deliberate together, they 
share their thoughts, they come to an agreement; one modifies his opinion 
to make it like another’s; opinions with the least support are incorporated 
into the two most widely held.”47 
Such judicial deliberations were a collegial process and a learned one. 
The collegiality, based on discussing cases in panels, moderated the 
judges’ decisions. Tempering came from within the judiciary, with power 
counteracting power, judge counteracting judge, just as, on a larger scale, 
the three branches of government counteracted each other. Also, the 
judges were supposed to be learned in the law and to follow it. 
Montesquieu insisted that legal “decisions should be preserved; they 
should be learned, so that one judges there today as one judged yesterday 
and so that the citizens’ property and life are as secure and fixed as the 
very constitution of the state.”48 Proper judging was necessary to liberty 
and was a task for professionals, not amateurs. 
C. Problems with Lay Juries 
Immediately after his description of professional judging, 
Montesquieu contrasted the entirely different process of lay judging—
judging by juries of the people. The first thing he pointed out was that any 
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dispute decided by the people must be radically simplified. The “people 
are not jurists; the modifications and temperings of arbiters are not for 
them; they must be presented with a single object, a deed, and only one 
deed, and they have only to see whether they should condemn, absolve, or 
remand judgment.”49 (Unlike Roman juries, English criminal juries only 
had the first two options.) Later in the book, Montesquieu even wrote 
favorably of the use of juries by the Romans and English in civil cases. 
But he attached a vital condition. Civil juries “decided only questions of 
fact; for example, if a sum had been paid or not, if an action had been 
committed or not.”50 Jurors were strictly confined. “But because questions 
of right required a certain ability,” these questions were given to 
professional judges in Roman practice.51 Professional judges decided not 
only questions of law, but application of law to fact. 
English common-law judges shared Montesquieu’s concerns about 
adjudication by lay jurors. At every turn, the common law was shaped by 
the need to simplify cases for the jury. This drastic simplification occurred 
even if that meant sacrificing accuracy of adjudication, as some disputes 
were unavoidably complicated. Early English judges required lawyers to 
plead down to a single factual issue in dispute.52 Over time, this 
requirement was slightly relaxed, but still, judges allowed only a few 
factual issues to go to a jury at a time. Courts strictly limited joinder of 
claims and joinder of parties. Remedies at common law became 
increasingly limited to damages, which were easy to announce, rather than 
specific performance.53 Any case more complicated was either truncated 
to fit the jury’s need for simplicity, or else sent to a wholly different system 
of adjudication, one that did not use juries: equity, in the Court of 
Chancery.54 
A second problem that Montesquieu identified early in his discussion 
of lay jurors was bias. The people’s envy or passion could be so great that 
miscarriages of justice occurred. In describing his concern for such 
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injustices, Montesquieu for the first time named Machiavelli. Machiavelli, 
he wrote, attributed the loss of liberty in Florence to the fact that the people 
as a body did not judge cases of high treason committed against them.55 
Montesquieu disagreed with him. In Montesquieu’s view, liberty was 
more likely to be lost by the people judging than by the people not judging. 
“I would gladly adopt this great man’s maxim,” he explained, “but as in 
these cases of treason, political interest forces civil interest, so to speak 
(for it is always a drawback if the people themselves judge their offenses), 
the laws must provide, as much as they can, for the security of individuals 
in order to remedy this drawback.”56 Individuals needed protections from 
biased lay jurors. 
Montesquieu described several protections against miscarriages of 
justice by the people’s biased decisions. The Romans allowed an accused 
person to exile himself before the judgment. They also wanted to make the 
goods of condemned men sacred so that the people could not confiscate 
them. It was a good idea, Montesquieu thought, to slow down prominent 
cases, in order to calm the people and allow them to judge with cool 
heads.57 
In Montesquieu’s view, one of the best remedies for jury error was a 
new trial. The Athenian Solon, Montesquieu explained, “knew very well 
how to curb the people’s abuses of their power when judging crimes.”58 
Solon wanted to make the Areopagus, a court composed of those who had 
held high office, an appellate body judging the criminal decisions of the 
people. In Montesquieu’s description of Solon’s proposal, if the 
Areopagus thought the people had made a mistake, either in falsely 
acquitting or condemning, the Areopagus would send the case back to the 
people. This procedure was similar to that of the new trial in civil cases, 
so beloved of English judges for correcting jury error.59 Montesquieu 
thought Solon’s procedure was “an admirable law” because it “subjected 
the people to the censure of the magistracy they most respected and to their 
own censure as well!”60 Like new trial, the procedure had the virtue of 
simply handing the case to a jury again, thus seeming to preserve the 
power of the people. Although Montesquieu did not mention this, new trial 
was and is a very expensive and time-consuming remedy. And there is no 
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guaranty that a second jury, or a third, or a fourth, will reach an accurate 
verdict. 
Later in the book, after he had exposed the reader to the pitfalls of lay 
juries, Montesquieu recommended taking certain criminal cases away 
from the jury altogether. This was because of the people’s bias. In 
recommending this change, Montesquieu clearly contradicted the practice 
of ancient republics and democracies, as well as Machiavelli’s opinion. 
“Important men are always exposed to envy; and if they were judged by 
the people, they could be endangered and would not enjoy the privilege of 
the last citizen of a free state, of being judged by his peers.”61 Therefore 
Montesquieu commended the English practice of trying a nobleman not 
by an ordinary jury, but by his peers in the House of Lords.62 
Again and again, Montesquieu emphasized that the people must not 
play a direct role in government. He completely rejected popular 
referenda, a power that “altogether exceeds the people’s capacity.” “The 
people should not enter government except to choose their 
representatives.”63 A representative republic had a great advantage over 
the ancient democracies, in which the people had “an immediate power,” 
because the people were so susceptible to demagogues. For, “when the 
orators agitated them, these agitations always had their effect.”64 Orators 
could have an effect on small groups of the people as well as large ones. 
Nineteenth-century American judges lamented the susceptibility of juries 
to being led astray by powerful advocates.65  
D. Advantages of Lay Juries 
With all of these problems of incompetence and bias, what was a 
popular jury actually good for? 
Montesquieu did recommend the institution. In fact, he claimed that, 
in England, the jurors were judges. And England was “the one nation in 
the world that has political liberty for its direct purpose.”66 In 
Montesquieu’s view, England was really a republic masquerading as a 
monarchy. In the beginning of his chapter titled, “On the constitution of 
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England,” he set out the tripartite division of power into legislative, 
executive, and judicial. Soon after, he wrote, “The power of judging 
should not be given to a permanent senate but should be exercised by 
persons drawn from the body of the people at certain times of the year in 
the manner prescribed by law to form a tribunal which lasts only as long 
as necessity requires.”67 
The next two sentences explain the seemingly odd recommendation to 
give the power of judging to laypersons: “In this fashion, the power of 
judging, so terrible among men, being attached neither to a certain state 
[status, such as nobility] nor to a certain profession, becomes, so to speak, 
invisible and null. Judges are not continually in view; one fears the 
magistracy, not the magistrates.”68 Just in case the reader missed it the first 
time, Montesquieu repeated a few pages later: “Among the three powers 
of which we have spoken, that of judging is in some fashion, null.”69 
“So to speak.” “In some fashion.” Montesquieu was inviting us to read 
between the lines. He had already described the importance of professional 
judges’ deliberations and judgments in preserving liberty. His very 
elevation of the judiciary to a separate power on par with the legislative 
and executive indicates the judiciary’s importance. The power of the 
judiciary is key to his whole constitutional scheme of liberty and 
moderation. It is not null. 
But it may be made “invisible,” or at least disguised. As Montesquieu 
pointed out, the power of judging is indeed “terrible among men.” It is a 
great responsibility to apply the law directly to an individual, to pronounce 
a civil litigant liable or a criminal defendant guilty, or the reverse, and to 
decree a particular amount of damages or a sentence. Such a power may 
well produce internal anxiety and attract external criticism and anger. 
Many judges would just as soon be relieved of that responsibility. Exercise 
of this power could eventually attract the jealousy and wrath of the people 
and the curtailing of judges’ moderating power. Perhaps that is one reason 
why Montesquieu continually warns against lay juries—the people—
judging the powerful. Those powerful persons could include judges. 
Use of lay juries deflects attention from the judges. Judges can claim 
that they had no responsibility for the outcome—it was the work of the 
people themselves. The lay jurors do the dirty work of deciding the facts 
and pronouncing the verdict, not the judge. The jurors get the 
responsibility and thus the blame. Not only that, but jurors may help 
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conceal the enormous role that common-law judges play in developing the 
law. 
Montesquieu went so far as to write that jurors are really “judges,” 
because “they make the judgments.”70 The real judges are thus able to hide 
behind the mask of the “judges” from the people. 
Professional judges are often reluctant to admit that they are glad that 
juries spare them the hard work and responsibility of judging. Judges 
praise juries for many other reasons, but almost never for the one that lies 
closest to their interests. Only rarely is a judge capable of discussing the 
subject with some candor. A striking example is Sir James Fitzjames 
Stephen, the late-nineteenth-century English High Court judge and 
criminologist. At the end of the first volume of his History of the Criminal 
Law of England, Stephen devoted a chapter to comparing French and 
English criminal justice.71 As with earlier English legal writers, knowledge 
of the French system provoked Stephen to explain and justify his own 
system.72 
Like Montesquieu, Stephen was quite open about the drawbacks of 
ordinary jurors. Stephen discussed their lack of intelligence and resulting 
confusion, bias, absence of legal training and knowledge, failure to pay 
attention to evidence, inability to give reasons for their decisions with 
resulting harm to appeal, and want of individual responsibility.73 
And yet, like Montesquieu, Stephen claimed that the jury was 
valuable. Not only did juries help to legitimize criminal judgments in the 
eyes of the people, but there was another reason. Stephen broached the 
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topic with some hesitation. He admitted that he was, “as every judge must 
be, a prejudiced witness on the subject.”74 After these warnings, he 
plunged in: 
It is hardly necessary to say that to judges in general the 
maintenance of trial by jury is of more importance than to any 
other members of the community [presumably including criminal 
defendants]. It saves judges from the responsibility—which to 
many men would appear intolerably heavy and painful—of 
deciding simply on their own opinion upon the guilt or innocence 
of the prisoner.75 
The nominally independent decision of the jury spared the judge both the 
internal pressure of making the decision entirely himself, and the external 
criticism that that decision might attract. He then pointed out that the judge 
acted as a guide and advisor to the jury through judicial comment on 
evidence. Stephen completely agreed with Montesquieu that juries 
deflected attention and responsibility from judges. 
Montesquieu recommended that the jury system be tweaked to 
enhance the public perception of justice and to further disguise judicial 
power. The litigants themselves should play a role in selecting the jurors. 
In important criminal cases, Montesquieu wrote, “the criminal in 
cooperation with the law must choose the judges,” that is, the jurors. Here 
again, perception was more important than reality. “[O]r at least he must 
be able to challenge so many of them that those who remain are considered 
to be of his choice.”76 Montesquieu did not describe the practice of 
challenges to jurors as a protection for the accused. The purpose was to 
hide the exercise of power under a veneer of choice. 
From the beginning of the institution in England in the thirteenth 
century, the use of the criminal jury was proclaimed to be by the 
defendant’s choice. This was a highly coerced choice; if the defendant 
refused, he would be pressed to death by piling rocks on his chest. The 
legal term for this procedure was peine forte et dure—“strong and harsh 
punishment.” Under the circumstances, few defendants objected to jury 
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trial. Still, every criminal defendant was ritually asked the question, “How 
wilt thou be tried?” and he was supposed to answer, “By God and by my 
country,” that is, by jury.77 
Not only was the institution of the jury supposedly used by the 
defendant’s choice, but the defendant supposedly had a large say in 
choosing the individual jurors. Blackstone praised “the extreme 
tenderness” of the English common law toward the accused, who at that 
time in felony cases was allowed 20 peremptory challenges to jurors.78 
What Blackstone did not mention was that the defendant hardly ever 
exercised any of these challenges, as he was allowed no voir dire.79 This 
was part of what made eighteenth-century English jury trial so speedy. If 
English defendants had regularly exercised these challenges, or anything 
approaching that number, the jury system would have collapsed from lack 
of jurors.80 Apparently Blackstone agreed with Montesquieu that the 
perception of “tenderness” was more important than the reality. 
Later in the book, Montesquieu addressed the question of jurors in 
civil cases. He commented that, among the Romans, it was “very favorable 
to liberty” that the officials in charge of the civil justice system selected 
the jurors with the consent of both parties. In his view, the many objections 
that civil litigants in England could make to jurors was the functional 
equivalent of choosing jurors by consent of the parties.81 In England, 
therefore, litigants could choose their own judges. Or at least appear to do 
so. 
E. English Judges’ Control over Juries 
If lay jurors really were the judges in fact and not just in name, this 
would be a disaster for liberty. We have seen that Montesquieu 
emphasized the shortcomings of lay jurors and the importance of 
professional judges. While hiding behind the mask of lay jurors, the 
professional judges must be firmly in charge. 
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Montesquieu himself gave few clues about how professional judges 
were to enforce their control. As was well-known, English judges had 
considerable power to declare the law. But this power would be useless if 
juries could nullify the law through perverse findings of fact or 
applications of law to fact. English judges had many ways to prevent this. 
One way to solve the problem was to take cases away from the jury 
altogether. For example, in civil cases the pleading process mentioned 
earlier sometimes resulted in no issues of fact for the jury, only questions 
of law. In that case, the English judges decided the law, which resolved 
the case. And English judges steadily expanded the law to embrace 
questions that had formerly been issues of fact.82 The judges also 
encouraged rules channeling evidence into written instruments, such as the 
Statute of Frauds of 1677.83 The act was largely designed by Matthew 
Hale, Chief Justice of King’s Bench, and had the effect of removing 
certain cases from the jury when there was no written instrument.84 
If jury trial did occur, English judges still had many powers. In 
England at the time, as Montesquieu may have known, the professional 
judges could and often did dominate juries. Judges mainly did this through 
what we would now call “instructions to the jury.” Back then (and even 
now), an English judge’s instructions looked quite different from the 
modern American practice of a dry, tedious, almost incomprehensible, and 
fact-free recitation of appellate-approved boilerplate. In both criminal and 
civil cases, an English judge could comment extensively on the evidence, 
and often gave the jury his opinion about how the case should come out.85 
Jurors were ordinarily eager to follow the judge’s views.86 
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Should the jury nevertheless bring in a verdict against his advice, the 
judge could ask the jury for their reasons for a verdict, discuss with the 
jury their reasons, refuse to record a verdict, and require re-deliberation.87 
In criminal cases, judges also in effect wielded a pardon power. The 
Crown almost never refused a judge’s recommendation for clemency.88 In 
civil cases there was the remedy of new trial, discussed above.89 In 
addition, for civil cases there was the backstop of Chancery, a court which 
sat without juries.90 
The only type of case in which English juries were apt to be resistant 
to this immense judicial control was what Lord Mansfield called “political 
cases.”91 These were mainly cases involving laws about religious 
conformity and seditious libel, or what we would call today “free exercise 
of religion” and “free speech.” Under modern political theory, these kinds 
of liberties are at the core of the modest aims of government. In these types 
of cases, English juries sometimes nullified the law. For example, in 1670 
an English jury acquitted William Penn, the founder of Pennsylvania, and 
William Mead of charges of illegally participating in a Quaker assembly.92 
There could be no doubt of Penn and Mead’s guilt. They both openly 
preached Quakerism. Likewise, English juries sometimes acquitted 
defendants of charges of seditious libel, although it was obvious that these 
defendants had illegally criticized the government.93 
From a Montesquieuian perspective, the reaction of English judges to 
this kind of jury nullification was brilliant. English judges decided to 
maintain and even enhance the nominal power of juries. That way, judges 
could quietly promote liberty, if they chose, and, in any event, avoid 
political trouble. 
The seminal decision was the opinion of John Vaughan, Chief Justice 
of Common Pleas, in 1670 in Bushell’s Case.94 Bushell’s Case stemmed 
directly from the case against Penn and Mead. After the jury acquitted 
Penn and Mead “contrary to the full and manifest evidence,” as the trial 
judge put it, and against his instructions, the trial judge fined the jurors. At 
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the time, this was a recognized remedy for juror misconduct. Eight of the 
12 jurors refused to pay the fine, and were imprisoned. Again, this was a 
recognized remedy. These jurors, including Edward Bushell, got a writ of 
habeas corpus from the court of Common Pleas, challenging the legality 
of their imprisonment. Chief Justice Vaughan gave an opinion declaring 
that jurors could not be fined for disobeying the trial judge’s instructions.95 
In the opinion in Bushell’s Case, Vaughan achieved his objective of 
giving nominal independence to jurors. He therefore got English judges 
out of the politically-charged business of making individual 
determinations on liberties, at least formally.96 Judges could claim that if 
juries wanted to nullify the law in certain cases, that was the jurors’ 
business and not the judges’ fault. Rather than outright declaring 
substantive liberties, the English left these liberties to a procedural 
mechanism, the jury. English judges were willing to give up the formal 
power to fine and imprison jurors because they had so many other means 
of jury control. 
Unfortunately, Montesquieu’s travel journals for his stay in England 
were either lost or destroyed, so we do not know precisely how much he 
was aware of English legal practice. We do know that after he returned to 
France, he kept up a correspondence with Charles Yorke, the son of the 
Lord Chancellor and later Lord Chancellor himself.97 So Montesquieu was 
familiar, at least, with the Court of Chancery and the practice of equity, 
and probably other features of the legal system as well. The likelihood is 
that he was aware that English judges dominated the jury. Such an 
awareness would have strengthened his belief that the jury could serve as 
a mask for the true judicial power: that of professional judges. Hiding 
behind the jury, judges could quietly continue to promote liberty and to 
serve as a moderating influence. 
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F. Montesquieu among the American Founders: The Anti-Federalists 
and Hamilton on Judges and Juries 
Montesquieu’s ideas were enormously influential among the 
American founders. Under Montesquieu’s influence, the framers of the 
U.S. Constitution developed the tripartite division of power among the 
legislature, executive, and judiciary. 
Raising the federal judicial power to the level of the legislative and 
executive, however, provoked serious concern and objection. As 
Montesquieu might have foreseen, the draft of the U.S. Constitution sent 
to the states for ratification triggered fears about an overweening power in 
federal judges. According to the draft, federal judges had life tenure and 
salary protection, and did not have to face election and re-election. This 
was a wonderful Montesquieuian recipe for independence. But it also 
meant that there was little control over the power of judges, so far as that 
power extended. 
Added to this judicial independence was a potentially tremendous new 
power. Recall that Montesquieu had urged that judges confine themselves 
to deciding private disputes, those involving individuals. He pointedly 
recommended that judges not get involved in “political law,” or disputes 
over public law.98 Such disputes could attract too much criticism, and in 
the end lead to a curtailing of judges’ power, with its promotion of liberty 
and moderation. England had found a way of controlling judges’ power. 
Following the Glorious Revolution, English judges achieved full 
independence. They got life tenure and eventually salary protection. But 
there was a major limitation on English judges’ power: Parliament was 
supreme. Parliament—not a court composed wholly of professional 
judges—was the highest court in the land. Therefore English judges had 
no power to void an act of Parliament. As American lawyers would put it, 
as to acts of Parliament, English judges had no power of judicial review.  
The situation under the draft of the U.S. Constitution was far different. 
Although the U.S. Constitution nowhere explicitly states that judges had 
the power to void acts of Congress and actions of the executive, that power 
was implied. It was well understood that a higher law trumped a lower. In 
England, for example, judges routinely held that an act of Parliament 
voided a contrary municipal regulation. The U.S. Constitution was clearly 
a higher law than an act of Congress. Judges had a duty to interpret and 
apply the law. Therefore it was widely understood that, under the U.S. 
Constitution, judges could and should void contrary acts of the legislature 
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and actions of the executive.99 Judges were the ones who would police the 
boundaries between the separate powers of the federal government.100 Not 
only that, but judges would also police the boundary between the federal 
government and the states. Against Montesquieu’s advice, American 
judges were enlisted to decide cases of “political law.” The framers of the 
U.S. Constitution had taken Montesquieu’s recommendation for more 
judicial power and raised it to an even greater level. That level was quite 
possibly injudicious and immoderate. No other nation had given 
independent professional judges such power.101 
This independence and power of review, united in the federal 
judiciary, understandably frightened some Americans. The Anti-
Federalists, like the Federalists, had read Montesquieu and celebrated his 
idea of checks on power.102 But they saw no checks on the federal 
judiciary. Anti-Federalists predicted that federal judges would become 
tyrannical. The Federal Farmer warned that “we are more in danger of 
sowing the seeds of arbitrary government in this department than in any 
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other.”103 Of the Anti-Federalists, Brutus was the most far-sighted in his 
critique of the provisions for the federal judiciary. He pointed out that the 
judges of the U.S. Supreme Court were to be totally independent, and yet 
to have vast power. “I question whether the world ever saw, in any period 
of it, a court of justice invested with such immense powers, and yet placed 
in a situation so little responsible.”104 Certainly this combination was 
“altogether unprecedented in a free country.”105 Brutus observed that the 
federal judges would have the power of judicial review over acts of 
Congress, and also over state legislatures. The U.S. Supreme Court’s 
natural tendency would be to enlarge the permitted scope of federal 
legislation—and its own power. The judges could adopt any method of 
reasoning, or unreasoning, they liked.106 
Unlike in England, where Parliament was supreme and the House of 
Commons faced elections, there would be no control on the decisions of 
the U.S. Supreme Court.107 Impeachment could be used only for treason, 
bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors, not for wrong 
decisions.108 The Constitution contained no check on the arbitrariness of 
the judges of the U.S. Supreme Court. “In short, they are independent of 
the people, of the legislature, and of every power under heaven. Men 
placed in this situation will generally soon feel themselves independent of 
heaven itself.”109 There would be no remedy for this judicial tyranny but 
forcible rebellion: “with a high hand and an outstretched arm.”110 
This fear of unprecedented power in federal judges helps to explain 
the Anti-Federalists’ insistence on the need for jury trial in federal court. 
They viewed the division of the court between judge and jury as similar to 
bicameralism in the legislature. Jury trial would provide some way to 
control the decisions of the professional judges. Otherwise, there would 
be none. 
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The Anti-Federalists generally did not invoke the old mixed-regime 
argument about the class bias of judges and the need to counter that class 
with representation of another class, the common people.111 As we will 
see, that was Blackstone’s main justification for the jury.112 Instead, most 
Anti-Federalists made an argument based on the modern separation of 
powers. According to that argument, all citizens had political equality, and 
power should be divided based not on class but rather function.113 In the 
case of courts, the Anti-Federalists explained, judges were supposed to 
decide the law and the jury the facts. 
But the line between fact and law was murky and shifting. We have 
seen that common-law judges steadily expanded the scope of law at the 
expense of fact.114 Because fact and law could be blended together in a 
way difficult to separate, Anti-Federalists emphasized the importance of 
the jury being allowed to give a general verdict in civil cases, as opposed 
to special verdicts that more strictly confined juries.115 
Lurking behind this question of the general verdict was the question 
of the jury’s ability to decide the law, or to nullify. In the years leading up 
to the American Revolution, Americans had celebrated juries’ 
nullification of unpopular British laws.116 American colonists had no 
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representation in the British Parliament, and colonial judges served at the 
pleasure of royal governors. Juries were therefore one of the only ways 
that colonial Americans, the people, had a voice in government. 
But with the advent of the new republic, the political situation of the 
people was much different. This was presumably one of the reasons why 
Anti-Federalists almost never argued openly for the jury’s ability to decide 
the law, or jury nullification. They hardly ever referred to jury 
nullification, including the celebrated cases during the run-up to the 
Revolution. Jury nullification seemed inappropriate in a modern 
democratic republic, with representation of the people and separation of 
powers. It certainly violated the idea of the division of functions between 
the judge and jury. 
Properly limited to questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and 
law, the jury was necessary as a check on judges. And the jury’s power, 
even its existence, appeared doubtful under the new constitution. Anti-
Federalists worried that there was no guaranty of civil jury trial in the U.S. 
Constitution.117 They were almost equally concerned that the U.S. 
Supreme Court was to be given appellate jurisdiction as to both law and 
fact.118 The latter provision appeared to contradict the common-law 
principle that the factual findings of a jury were not subject to appeal.119 
The pamphlets of Brutus, the Federal Farmer, and other Anti-
Federalists were widely read and popular at the time the state ratifying 
conventions were elected and debating the provisions of the draft U.S. 
Constitution.120 In order for the plan to be ratified, supporters of the draft 
constitution had to find a way to assuage these fears. 
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What better way to do that than to turn to Montesquieu again? Judges’ 
enormous power could be masked. Well-versed in Montesquieuian tactics, 
Alexander Hamilton took on the task. His essays in The Federalist 
numbers 78 through 83 are a direct response to Brutus’s critique of the 
federal judiciary.121 Hamilton’s essays rigorously and analytically defend 
the provisions of the draft U.S. Constitution concerning judicial 
independence and the precise grants of jurisdiction to federal courts in 
Article III, as well as the implication of judicial review. And yet, in 
important respects, Hamilton’s essays are a lullaby addressed to 
Americans crying out against excessive judicial power. 
Hamilton quickly revealed the source of his inspiration. In his first 
essay on the judiciary, in The Federalist number 78, he announced that 
“the judiciary is beyond comparison the weakest of the three departments 
of power.”122 He dropped a footnote to that statement: “The celebrated 
Montesquieu, speaking of [the judges] says, ‘of the three powers above 
mentioned, the JUDICIARY is next to nothing.’ Spirit of Laws, vol. 1, page 
186.”123 
Again, following Montesquieu, one of Hamilton’s soothing arguments 
was that judges would follow the law and precedent, and not be self-
willed.124 This argument echoed passages in Spirit of the Laws in which 
Montesquieu implied that, in a republic, judges had no discretion in 
determining the law, and simply followed it mechanically.125 (As we have 
seen, in other passages Montesquieu made clear that judges did in fact 
have discretion in shaping and applying law.126) 
Hamilton devoted his very last and longest essay on the judiciary to 
trial by jury. In The Federalist number 83, Hamilton was at his most 
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reassuring. At least, he was reassuring as to the need for the jury in 
criminal cases. But sustained reading reveals Hamilton’s grave misgivings 
about the civil jury. Ever since, supporters of the jury have downplayed 
his criticisms. Like his predecessor Montesquieu, Hamilton saw serious 
drawbacks to adjudication by lay jurors. 
Hamilton opened his essay on the jury by explaining that the most 
successful objection to the draft U.S. Constitution was the lack of a 
guarantee of jury trial in civil cases.127 This was a remarkable admission, 
and suggests the depth of concern about a tyrannical federal judiciary. 
Criminal jury trial was guaranteed in Article III, section 2 of the draft U.S. 
Constitution, but the draft included no right to civil jury trial. Hamilton 
protested that silence did not mean abolition.128 
Hamilton’s next move was to lavish praise on jury trial while 
emphasizing agreement between Federalists and Anti-Federalists. “The 
friends and adversaries of the plan of the convention, if they agree in 
nothing else, concur at least in the value they set upon the trial by 
jury . . . .” The only difference between them was that “the former regard 
it as a valuable safeguard to liberty,” while “the latter represent it as the 
very palladium of free government.”129 This is the language that American 
lawyers and judges have quoted ever since. They ignore the rest of the 
essay, in which Hamilton made quite a different point. 
Having emphasized this harmonious unity about jury trial in the 
beginning of a paragraph, in the middle of that paragraph Hamilton 
suddenly pivoted. He injected the critical word “but.” “But I must 
acknowledge, that I cannot readily discern the inseparable connection 
between the existence of liberty, and the trial by jury, in civil cases.”130 
Criminal jury trial prevented tyranny, but civil jury trial was a different 
matter. 
Hamilton spent the rest of the essay, the considerable majority of the 
longest essay he wrote on the judiciary, attacking civil jury trial. He also 
explained why it would be extraordinarily difficult to draft a right to civil 
jury trial for the federal constitution. His criticisms of the civil jury deserve 
close attention, which I cannot give here but plan to in future writing. For 
this Article, it is enough to point out that his two main criticisms of lay 
adjudication in civil cases agree with criticisms that Montesquieu made. 
First, jury trial requires radical simplification of a dispute: “the matter to 
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be decided should be reduced to some single and obvious point.”131 This 
made civil jury trial ineligible for many cases, which required more 
complicated adjudication. Second, jurors were not learned in the law and 
therefore were not able to handle critical cases turning on, for example, 
the law of nations.132 Under this latter objection lay the fear of jury bias, 
especially bias against foreigners. Such bias had been well-demonstrated 
in states that had allowed maritime and admiralty prize cases to go to 
juries.133 The results in those cases threatened to upset the crucial foreign 
relations of the fledgling republic. 
The best—indeed, almost the only—reason Hamilton saw for civil 
jury trial depended on a circumstance that he described as “foreign to the 
preservation of liberty.”134 That was corruption in the judiciary. In 
Hamilton’s view, civil jury trial did not have many virtues in itself, but it 
could check corrupt judges, if absolutely necessary, as a second-best 
measure. Hamilton implied that the evil of corrupt judges should be 
addressed at its source. As we will see in the conclusion of this Article, the 
problem of corrupt judges is significant today. 
Hamilton, like Montesquieu before him, advocated for a strong 
judiciary but tried to mask its powers. Also like Montesquieu, he endorsed 
jury trial, which had the happy effect of deflecting attention from judges. 
But the drawbacks that he and Montesquieu saw in lay adjudication 
suggested significant limitations on the scope of jury trial, especially civil 
jury trial. Four decades later, another follower of Montesquieu was to 
analyze the American civil jury, and also conclude that it could enhance 
the power of judges. 
II. TOCQUEVILLE ON JUDGES AND JURIES 
Alexis Charles-Henri-Maurice Clérel de Tocqueville (1805–1859) 
was, like Montesquieu, a Frenchman, a nobleman, and a judge. Also like 
Montesquieu, he spent some time living in an English-speaking country 
with a common-law legal system. But with Tocqueville, we seem to be in 
a different world. He was writing a century later than Montesquieu. France 
had passed through an initially promising but then bloody revolution, a 
dictatorship, and several regime changes after that. The American 
Revolution had established a republic, with Montesquieuian separation of 
powers, including a fully independent judiciary as a co-equal branch of 
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government. At the time Tocqueville visited America, the nation was in 
the grip of an enthusiasm for democracy never equaled before or since. In 
France, the nobility had been partly killed off during the revolution, and 
the remnant had lost its former legal privileges and considerable property, 
though it retained social prestige. Tocqueville entered a French judiciary 
that was organized more or less along modern bureaucratic lines; offices 
were no longer inherited, bought, and sold. The French government had 
loosened controls on the press, and Tocqueville had no trouble publishing 
his works in Paris under his own name. His style is much more direct than 
Montesquieu’s. Although, like Montesquieu, he was trained in the 
classics, he made far fewer references to ancient Greek and Roman 
literature and practices. Tocqueville’s world is more familiar to us. 
Yet, as we will see, many of his concerns were the same. Montesquieu 
greatly influenced his thinking, as Tocqueville’s letter to his cousin, 
quoted in the Introduction, suggests. Like Montesquieu, Tocqueville 
believed that the judiciary was a moderating force that was key to 
preserving liberty. And he believed that the purpose of juries was to 
enhance the judges’ power. He was much more open about the 
mechanism: judicial comment on evidence and instructions to the jury. 
A. Tocqueville’s Judicial Career, Travels in America, and Democracy in 
America 
Tocqueville had reasons to be interested in political stability and 
moderation. He was an aristocrat with family estates in Normandy. During 
the French Revolution, his parents were imprisoned in a dungeon and 
many of his relatives guillotined. After that, France went through a 
republic, an imperial dictatorship under Napoleon, and a restored 
monarchy. 
Tocqueville also had a particular interest in law and the legal system; 
he was a judge. Americans often overlook his judicial career. But his close 
involvement with the legal system sheds light on his views about America 
and democracy. And his operating in an inquisitorial system provides a 
striking contrast with, and perspective on, the common-law system. 
Tocqueville got his job as a judge through family influence. Under the 
Bourbon Restoration (1814–1830), the old nobility was in favor, and 
Tocqueville’s family achieved some political prominence. His father 
became the prefect of Versailles. Thanks to his father, in 1827 after a 
period of legal studies the 21-year-old Tocqueville got a job in the 
Versailles prefecture as a juge-auditeur.135 French courts were divided into 
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two chambers, one for hearing and deciding cases, and the other for 
investigating and prosecuting. The latter was and is known as the parquet, 
from the parquet floors on which its members stood to speak. The juge-
auditeur was the lowest position in the parquet. This was an unsalaried 
position for young gentlemen. Tocqueville’s job was to investigate both 
civil and criminal matters and to prepare written reports on his findings for 
the adjudicating chamber of the court. In a common-law system, this work 
would have been done almost entirely by the lawyers or other agents of 
the parties, not by a judge. 
The ambitious young man worked hard. During his time as a juge-
auditeur, he investigated and prepared reports in about 60 cases, and the 
reports were thorough. Some of the civil cases were suits by nobles to 
recover lands and other property lost during the revolution. 
Understandably, given his background, he sympathized with the 
dispossessed nobles, but he concluded that the intervening transactions 
could not be undone. He also, on occasion, appeared as a prosecutor before 
the highest criminal court of Versailles. His immediate boss, Gustave de 
Beaumont, another aristocrat a few years older who became Tocqueville’s 
close friend, wrote that Tocqueville impressed the judges with his 
intelligence and maturity of judgment.136 
Tocqueville expected that this position would be the beginning of a 
legal career. He was eager for promotion to a higher-level—and salaried—
position in the judiciary. But political events intervened. In July 1830, 
France underwent yet another revolution. Tocqueville was in Paris when 
it happened, and at the time he wrote to his future wife about hearing the 
“cries of fury and despair” in the street and his horror at seeing 
“Frenchmen cutting each other’s throats for fun.”137 The July Revolution 
produced the new king Louis-Philippe, the “bourgeois king,” and once 
again the old aristocracy was suspect. The upheaval stymied Tocqueville’s 
judicial career. 
America was an escape. Tocqueville’s relative, the poet and political 
figure François-René de Chateaubriand, inspired him to take an interest in 
America. Thirty-five years before, during another time of political turmoil 
in France, Chateaubriand had visited America. He had recently written two 
books about it.138 Why not Tocqueville? Tocqueville hatched a plan to visit 
America with his friend Beaumont. But neither wanted to resign his 
 
 136. Id. at 78–84. On Tocqueville’s lifelong friendship with Beaumont, see 
ANDRÉ JARDIN, TOCQUEVILLE: A BIOGRAPHY 79–81 (Lydia Davis trans., 1988) 
(first published in French in 1984). 
 137. BROGAN, supra note 135, at 129–30 (Tocqueville to Mary Mottley). 
 138. FRANÇOIS-RENÉ DE CHATEAUBRIAND, LES NATCHEZ (1826); FRANÇOIS-
RENÉ DE CHATEAUBRIAND, VOYAGE EN AMÉRIQUE (1827). 




judicial post. The new regime was interested in reform movements. 
Tocqueville and Beaumont declared to their superiors that they wanted to 
go on a fact-finding mission to study American prisons. America was then 
viewed as at the forefront of penal reform. Official permission was 
granted, their two families agreed to pay for the trip, and off they went.139 
From the first, Tocqueville had in mind a broad study of American 
society. In May 1831, he and Beaumont landed in New York City and 
spent the next nine months touring the United States, with an excursion 
into Canada. They collected documents, read books and newspapers, 
attended public meetings and private social functions, and spoke with 
Americans in all regions. Their voyages remind us of the vast geography 
and variety of North America: from New York City into upstate New 
York, across Lake Erie to Detroit, up to Québec and Montréal, down to 
Boston and Hartford, then to Philadelphia and Baltimore, over to Pittsburg 
and Cincinnati, and overland through Kentucky and Tennessee. From 
Memphis, Tocqueville and Beaumont chugged down the Mississippi 
River by steamboat to New Orleans and over to Mobile, and from there 
overland up to Norfolk, Virginia. During that grueling 900-mile journey, 
they passed through Alabama, Georgia, South Carolina, and North 
Carolina. From Norfolk they headed up to the capital in Washington. 
Finally, in late February 1832, they sailed from New York for France.140 
Back in France, in 1835 Tocqueville published the first volume of his 
Democracy in America. The second volume followed in 1840. Tocqueville 
was fascinated by the new type of government he observed in America. 
He saw that a trend toward democracy was likely in France. In a letter 
home, he wrote that unlimited democracy in his native country was “an 
irresistible force.” He added, “I don’t say this is a good thing.”141 So for 
Tocqueville, the visit to America was like a glimpse into the future of his 
own society. 
In Democracy in America, Tocqueville was aiming to reveal how 
democracy was sustained and controlled. What interested him was not so 
much Americans’ fractiousness, but what contained their fractiousness. He 
wanted to understand the forces that curbed democracy and partisanship, 
that made it sustainable, at least in the medium term, without resort to the 
bloodshed so familiar in France. Like Montesquieu, he was looking for 
moderating forces. And, like Montesquieu, he believed that one of these 
was an aristocracy.  
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But where was an aristocratic principle to be found in America? 
Americans seemed more ferociously egalitarian by the day. That is, they 
were egalitarian as to white men. In 1828, shortly before Tocqueville’s 
visit, Andrew Jackson was elected president. The era of Jacksonian 
Democracy had begun. The first half of the nineteenth century in America 
was the age of popular elections. Large numbers of white men, of all 
classes, began to vote in elections and to participate in civil discourse. In 
state after state, property restrictions on voting fell. By 1830, virtually all 
white men 21 years or older could vote. No longer was politics mainly a 
gentleman’s game. Gone were speeches and writings filled with classical 
allusions, and pseudonyms drawn from the Roman republic, such as 
Brutus and Publius. In their place, a plainer style of discourse emerged, 
aimed at all classes. Vanished were closed party caucuses and many 
executive and legislative appointments. Parties met to pick candidates in 
open, raucous conventions.142 
Soon it seemed that every office possible was popularly elected, from 
militia officers to judges. One delegate to a state constitutional convention 
quipped, “We have provided for the popular election of every public 
officer save the dog catcher, and if the dogs could vote, we should have 
that as well.”143 Secrecy was abhorred.144 Citizens had to see proceedings 
to have a role in decision-making. Ordinary Americans took an intense 
interest in politics. Tocqueville struggled to describe Americans’ 
“ceaseless agitation” over politics. “It is hard to explain the place filled by 
political concerns in the life of an American. To take a hand in the 
government of society and to talk about it is his most important business 
and, so to say, the only pleasure he knows.”145 This preoccupation 
pervaded all of life and society. Even the women, he wrote, went to public 
meetings and listened to political speeches as recreation from their 
household labors. For Americans, debating clubs substituted for 
theaters.146 
Amidst this democratic frenzy, Tocqueville believed that he found the 
most important curbing force: the legal profession. 
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B. Tocqueville on the American Legal Profession 
To understand Tocqueville’s views about the jury, we must 
understand his opinion of American lawyers and judges. The section 
immediately before his famous discussion of the jury concerns lawyers 
and judges. Tocqueville characterized the legal profession as “the only 
aristocratic element” which could mingle with democracy and temper the 
tyranny of the majority. “It is at the bar or the bench that the American 
aristocracy is to be found.”147 In American towns and cities, lawyers were 
typically the most intellectual citizens. The study of law gave lawyers a 
natural preference for order and formalities. Every day they had to direct 
“the blind passions of litigants” toward legal objectives, which gave 
lawyers “a certain scorn for the judgment of the crowd.”148 Tocqueville 
attributed to American lawyers the aristocratic and moderating influence 
that Montesquieu reserved for judges. 
In painting his picture of order-loving lawyers, Tocqueville glossed 
over lawyers’ potential for demagoguery. Recall that Montesquieu had 
warned about the people’s susceptibility to demagogues.149 This 
demagoguery could function on a grand scale, whipping up emotion on 
great political issues, or on a smaller scale, fomenting among the jury and 
populace “blind passions” in favor of their clients. Contemporary 
American observers—including artists—thought that lawyers’ potential 
for demagoguery was a great danger, both to politics and to the legal 
system.150 One of these critics was Abraham Lincoln, himself a lawyer and 
politician, and a successful advocate before juries. In his famous 
Springfield Lyceum address in 1838, Lincoln pleaded with Americans to 
reject a political discourse of emotion in favor of reason. Otherwise, he 
warned, American democratic institutions were in danger.151 Some of the 
greatest skeptics about the civil jury were judges who had been lawyers 
with extraordinary skill at rousing juror emotion.152 Tocqueville seems to 
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have counted on the judge’s firm guidance in instructions and comment 
on evidence to the jury to counteract the effects of lawyers’ rhetoric. 
Tocqueville also ignored lawyers’ character as a special-interest 
group. Not everything that was good for lawyers was good for the nation. 
The American legal system was widely believed to be too unpredictable, 
prone to delays, and expensive.153 Under these conditions, lawyers 
prospered. 
Why did Tocqueville have such a favorable view of American 
lawyers? Why did he tend to overlook the harm that lawyers did? It is 
possible that Tocqueville may have been too influenced by a bias in his 
sources. In his travel notebooks, he recorded conversations with a large 
number of “distinguished lawyers.”154 It was natural that Tocqueville 
would seek out lawyers. He shared with them a professional interest in 
law. And lawyers tended to be more educated, and to have more 
intellectual tastes and a deeper knowledge of government, than other 
Americans. He may have been too swayed by their flattering portrait of 
their profession. 
But it is also possible that his favorable view of American lawyers was 
part of his admiration for the common-law legal system. Throughout his 
writings, this admiration was a significant theme. Like Montesquieu, he 
viewed the common-law system as liberty-enhancing. From personal 
experience, he was deeply aware of the flaws of his own legal system in 
France. Tocqueville was not blind to the flaws of the common-law, 
adversarial systems. He could portray them as grievous. In the notes to his 
1856 book on the French Ancien Régime, he laid out the common-law 
system’s flaws with devastating clarity. In England, he wrote, justice was 
expensive and full of delays. There was a striking lack of inferior courts 
with power to render speedy and inexpensive justice to poor litigants.155 
(England had begun to address this problem with the County Courts Act 
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of 1846.156) In comparison, the French legal system was a model of 
efficiency and rationality. 
Still, Tocqueville believed the advantages of the common-law system 
outweighed the disadvantages, at least in curbing government tyranny. He 
was impressed with the English and American ability to maintain political 
order with a measure of freedom. A striking difference between France 
and those two countries was a subject close to him: the legal system. A 
major reason for the relative stability and liberty of the nations must lie 
there. 
The key, Tocqueville believed, was the small number, high quality, 
and independence of the common-law judges. Such judges inspired 
respect and could effectively check political excesses. They were a sort of 
aristocracy that could serve as a moderating, liberty-promoting force. 
In his travel journal, Tocqueville commented on the special role that 
judges played in the American scheme of separation of powers—which 
was the first fully modern scheme, because America was the first true mass 
democracy. “A completely democratic government is so dangerous an 
instrument that, even in America, men have been obliged to take a host of 
precautions against the errors and passions of Democracy. The 
establishment of two chambers, the governor’s veto, and above all the 
establishment of the judges.”157 
American judges, Tocqueville wrote, combined the usual 
conservative, lawyerly tendencies with an interest in maintaining order for 
the sake of their office.158 That office carried great political power. 
Tocqueville made much of the power of judicial review.159 This power did 
not exist in England or in France. At least, in England there was no power 
to declare acts of Parliament void. American judges, armed with the power 
to declare laws unconstitutional, were constantly intervening in political 
affairs. A judge “cannot compel the people to make laws, but at least he 
can constrain them to be faithful to their own laws and remain in harmony 
with themselves.”160 An important constraint on this “immense political 
power” was that judges were passive and had to wait for an actual dispute 
to arise and be presented to them.161 On the surface at least, Tocqueville 
did not share the Anti-Federalists’ concern that there was no check if 
judges abused the power of judicial review. He explained that the federal 
Constitution could be amended, and the people could thereby “reduce the 
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judges to obedience.”162 In this context, Tocqueville glossed over the 
difficulty of amending the federal Constitution. 
Tocqueville’s writing returned again and again to the fact that England 
and America, compared with France, had very few judges. Their small 
numbers made the judges more prestigious and powerful. At least, it did if 
the judges had long, guaranteed tenure. Tocqueville was alarmed that 
some American states elected judges for short tenures. He predicted that, 
sooner or later, judicial elections would have “dire results.” Such elections 
subverted judges’ independence and made it impossible for judges to play 
their proper role in curbing democracy.163 
Tocqueville’s emphasis on the power of judges immensely affected 
his view of the value of the jury. According to Tocqueville, the jury was 
actually a curb on democracy and the tyranny of the majority. To many 
Americans, the jury seemed like a manifestation of direct democracy. How 
could the jury be a restraint on democracy? 
C. Tocqueville on the Jury as a Judicial Institution 
Tocqueville did not repeat Anglo-American cheerleading slogans 
about the jury. He wrote that the jury could be considered as a judicial 
institution, or as a political institution.164 
As a judicial institution, Tocqueville strongly implied, the jury fell 
short. It fell short particularly in civil cases. “If it were a question of 
deciding how far the jury, especially the jury in civil cases, facilitates the 
good administration of justice, I admit that its usefulness can be 
contested.”165 The jury system, he wrote, arose “in the infancy of society,” 
when the English were “a semibarbarian people.” At that time, courts 
decided only simple questions of fact. It was “no easy task to adapt it to 
the needs of a highly civilized nation, where the relations between men 
have multiplied exceedingly and have been thoughtfully elaborated in a 
learned manner.”166As a judicial institution, the jury did not seem at all 
suited to a complex commercial society with necessarily elaborate laws. 
Nevertheless, Tocqueville wrote, the English had hastened to establish 
juries in their colonies all over the globe, and everywhere alike extolled 
the institution. The institution “cannot be contrary to the spirit of 
justice.”167 
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Tocqueville did mention one advantage of the jury considered as a 
judicial institution. He discussed this point in a footnote in his chapter on 
the jury considered as a political institution.168 In Tocqueville’s view, the 
great advantage of the jury considered as a judicial institution was one that 
no one from the common-law world had discussed. The jury allowed the 
number of judges to be reduced.169 Instead of having to investigate and 
decide the facts himself, as on the continent of Europe, a judge could 
simply allow the parties to investigate and present facts and hand the case 
to a jury. Thus, the system needed fewer judges. 
Tocqueville did not mention the enormous role that advocates play in 
investigating and presenting facts in an adversarial system. That feature, 
more than juries, reduces the number of judges needed. In England and the 
United States, the work that Tocqueville had done as a junior judge 
investigating cases would have been done entirely by the parties. 
This reliance on the parties to investigate and present facts produces 
two major problems: the bias effect and the wealth effect.170 It is the 
responsibility of parties—meaning their lawyers—to find and “prepare” 
witnesses. This party control of witnesses, together with the likelihood that 
the other party will vigorously attack witness credibility on cross-
examination, tends to drive witnesses to shade testimony heavily in favor 
of the side that called them. And wealthier parties have an advantage in 
being able to fund more extensive investigation and skillful presentation. 
These problems of the adversarial system persist regardless of the quality 
of the judge. 
For Tocqueville, fewer judges were a “great advantage” for two 
reasons. First, in a large and hierarchical judiciary, as in France, death was 
constantly producing gaps that ambitious judges strove to fill, by moving 
up the hierarchy. Their independence was therefore questionable, as they 
were apt to curry favor with whatever group or individual was making the 
appointment. Tocqueville analogized judicial promotion to promotion in 
the military.171 His argument about lack of judicial independence may 
reflect his frustration at having his career stalled because of his family 
being disfavored under the Louis-Phillipe monarchy. Tocqueville had 
been an ambitious young judge himself. He had worked hard and well in 
order to get promoted. In the judiciary of modern European countries, as 
in the U.S. military, this ambition is not so much considered a problem but 
a feature. It helps to encourage good performance in the job.  
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Second, Tocqueville wrote, in a smaller judiciary the quality of judges 
was likely to be higher.172 The key to making the jury system work 
properly, therefore, was for the judge to guide the jury. “For my part, I 
would rather have a case decided by an ignorant jury guided by a skilled 
judge than hand it over to judges, most of whom have an incomplete 
knowledge both of jurisprudence and of the laws.”173 In other words, better 
an ignorant jury guided by a good judge than mediocre judges. 
D. Tocqueville on the Jury as a Political Institution: “A Free School” 
Tocqueville’s brief discussion of the jury as a judicial institution set 
the stage for his famous argument about the jury as a political institution. 
Those who quote Tocqueville superficially miss this point. The key to 
Tocqueville’s argument about the jury as a political institution is that the 
jurors must be firmly guided by a good judge. 
1.Tocqueville’s Similarity to Montesquieu, and His New Idea 
Tocqueville was at his most Montesquieuian in the beginning of his 
chapter on the jury as a political institution. Like Montesquieu, he 
proclaimed that the jurors actually were the judges. At least, Tocqueville 
wrote that they were so in criminal cases. Tocqueville seemed to be saying 
that criminal jurors were even more powerful than Montesquieu had 
suggested. Tocqueville wrote: “[T]he man who is judge in criminal trial is 
the real master of society. Now, a jury puts the people themselves or at 
least one class of citizen on the judge’s bench. Therefore the jury as an 
institution really puts control of society into the hands of the people or of 
that class.”174 
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So far, Tocqueville seemed to be closely following Montesquieu’s 
playbook. But then he made a series of strange statements about juries in 
civil cases. Montesquieu had claimed that the jurors were the judges in 
both criminal and civil cases.175 Tocqueville distinguished the two. 
Tocqueville did not say that the jurors were the judges in civil cases. He 
did write that in civil cases, because juries were so prominent, they 
affected so many interests, and “everyone serves on them,” “it is hardly 
too much to say that the idea of justice becomes identified with” the civil 
jury.176 He claimed that the jury was always vulnerable as long as juries 
were only used in criminal cases. But if juries were also used in civil cases, 
the institution became permanent. So it was “the civil jury that really saved 
the liberties of England.”177 
That statement about civil juries seemed dramatic and 
counterintuitive, but more was to come. Tocqueville wrote that no matter 
how a nation used juries, juries were bound to have an influence on the 
national character. “But that influence is immeasurably increased the more 
they are used in civil cases.”178 
At this point, the reader should be puzzled. We have seen that 
Tocqueville, like Montesquieu, had grave misgivings about the ability of 
the people to judge. Tocqueville has just told us that his misgivings were 
especially strong in civil cases. We have also seen that Tocqueville, like 
Montesquieu, extolled the power of the professional judiciary and thought 
that it was vital to moderating government and preserving liberty. Why, 
then, did he think that civil juries were so important? 
Tocqueville next proclaimed a startling idea. 
The point of the jury, especially the civil jury, was not to judge fairly 
between litigants. Nor was it to prevent tyranny, at least not directly. Nor 
was it to legitimize judgments in the eyes of the people. Instead, explained 
Tocqueville, the purpose of the jury was to educate the jurors. The jurors 
were not a means to an end; they were the end. The institution existed for 
them. Tocqueville declared that the jury was “a free school” for 
democracy. “I do not know whether a jury is useful to the litigants, but I 
am sure it is very good for those who have to decide the case. I regard it 
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as one of the most effective means of popular education at society’s 
disposal.”179 
In a moment, we will see how Tocqueville thought that education was 
supposed to take place. Again, we will encounter a startling idea. But first, 
we will take a look at the antecedents of Tocqueville’s concept of the jury 
as a school and that concept’s inseparable connection with democracy. 
2. American Antecedents for the Idea of the Jury as a School 
The rationale of the jury as a school could only have arisen in the 
context of a democracy. And the United States was the first mass 
democracy. Recall the classic concern about democracies, that the people 
would be inadequate to the demands of politics.180 As Martin Diamond put 
it, “The history of modern democracy is a history of the effort to balance 
the equation between the demands of the political and the capacity of the 
many.”181 Lowering the demands of the political, by setting out modest 
aims for government, could help—so could raising the capacity of the 
many. Hence in almost all democracies there is a strong faith in popular 
education. 
Montesquieu emphasized that in a republic, and especially a 
democracy, education was vital. Democratic republics depended on 
citizens having political virtue. This virtue was difficult to achieve. 
“[S]uch virtue is a renunciation of oneself, which is always a very painful 
thing.”182 He defined this virtue as love of the laws and the homeland. 
Education should attentively cultivate this love. Without love of the laws 
and the homeland, a democratic republic would fail. “Now government is 
like all things in the world; in order to preserve it, one must love it.”183 
Montesquieu did not mention the jury as a possible way to educate the 
citizenry in love of the laws and the homeland, but one of his careful 
readers did. 
To see the importance of democracy in changing the rationale of the 
jury, a comparison with England is instructive. Blackstone praised the jury 
to the skies.184 He had learned well from his mentor Montesquieu how to 
conceal judicial power.185 He pretended, along with Montesquieu, that 
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English jurors really did decide the facts all by themselves. He entirely 
omitted any discussion of judges’ dominance of the jury through comment 
and instruction.186 When one cuts through Blackstone’s voluminous 
hyperbole and finds his reasons for the institution, the main one he gave 
reflected the mixed regime: class bias. Class divides were deep in 
eighteenth-century England. Because the judges might have “an 
involuntary bias toward those of their own rank and dignity,”187 the 
common people, the jurors, should be and were incorporated into judicial 
decision-making. Blackstone did not suggest any purpose of educating 
jurors in self-governance. There would be no point. England in the 
eighteenth century was not a democracy. 
But a democracy did arise a few decades later across the ocean, and 
there we see the first stirrings of the idea that jury service could be used 
for education in the art of politics. Democracy, modern separation of 
powers, and the idea of the jury as a school for self-governance developed 
together. 
In America, there were precedents for Tocqueville’s idea of the 
educative purpose of the jury. One precedent was the practice in the early 
republic of federal grand jury charges. Soon after the new nation was 
formed, the justices of the U.S. Supreme Court began riding circuit around 
the country. During the 1790s, many of them delivered charges to federal 
grand juries that were explicitly intended to educate jurors in the 
knowledge and manners needed for republican self-governance.188 Often 
local newspapers printed these charges. Justice James Wilson even 
incorporated parts of his academic lectures on law into grand jury 
charges.189 But the justices had to be careful not to be too overtly political 
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in teaching grand jurors, as the impeachment of Justice Samuel Chase in 
1804 showed.190 
Whether Tocqueville was aware of this earlier practice of educative 
grand jury charges is unclear. If Tocqueville knew about it, he transformed 
the idea considerably in Democracy in America. Federal judges had used 
mainly criminal cases and especially grand jury charges to educate jurors. 
Tocqueville, as we will see, thought that jurors needed little education in 
criminal matters. For him, civil cases were the main classroom for judges 
to teach jurors. 
There was another source from which Tocqueville might have derived 
the idea of the jury as a school. This was Edward Livingston’s widely-read 
1822 report on the penal code he had drafted for Louisiana.191 Livingston 
was originally from New York. In his report, Livingston explained that he 
was giving a thorough account of reasons for the jury because Louisiana 
had no practice of jury trial under Spanish or French rule.192 Again, an 
encounter with the civil law prompted an important explanation of the 
common-law institution. In the context of arguing for the rule that a 
criminal defendant should not be able to waive jury trial, Livingston 
pointed to the institution’s benefits to the public. One of the reasons 
Livingston gave was thoroughly American: “It diffuses the most valuable 
information among every rank of citizens; it is a school, of which every 
jury that is empaneled, is a separate class; where the dictates of the laws, 
and the consequences of disobedience to them, are practically taught.”193 
It would be surprising if Tocqueville had not read Livingston’s report. 
Tocqueville was especially interested in Louisiana because of the mixture 
of civil law and common law elements in its legal system. Livingston’s 
report was published in London in 1824. Tocqueville met with Livingston, 
then Secretary of State, in Washington. In Democracy in America, 
Livingston is the only interlocutor whom Tocqueville mentions by name. 
There Tocqueville says of him, “Mr. Livingston is one of those rare men 
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whose writings inspire affection, so that we admire and respect them even 
before we know them.”194 
But Tocqueville significantly altered Livingston’s idea. For 
Livingston, as for early federal judges, criminal cases were the vital 
classroom. And Livingston portrayed the judge as distant, more like a 
principal in this school than a teacher.195 
It was in conversations with officials, lawyers, and judges in Boston 
and Philadelphia that Tocqueville more fully developed his idea of the 
civil jury as a school, with the judge as skillful teacher. These persons had 
doubts about the competence of jurors to decide cases.196 According to 
Tocqueville’s notes, in Boston, Francis Calley Gray, a prison inspector 
and state senator, told him that the courts were the most powerful part of 
government in the state and that civil trials, especially, encouraged a 
“union and mutual confidence” between “the people and the 
magistracy.”197 Charles Pelham Curtis, the legal solicitor of Boston, 
emphasized that civil juries were less competent than judges but, 
nevertheless, enjoyed great public support. Soon after these conversations, 
Tocqueville drafted a short essay on the jury arguing that the use of juries 
supported the power of judges.198 
Tocqueville saw jury trials in Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and 
Cincinnati. Tocqueville met with a federal judge in Boston, but does not 
appear to have been overly moved by the judge telling him that American 
judges often deferred to juries, even when the judges disagreed with 
verdicts and had the power to overturn them.199 
Probably Tocqueville’s most significant conversation about the jury 
occurred in Philadelphia with Henry D. Gilpin. The two men spoke for 
half a day. Considering his background, Gilpin’s politics were unusual. 
Despite an elite banking and manufacturing family, extensive English 
connections, a fine classical education, literary interests, and success at the 
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Philadelphia bar, Gilpin became a fervent Jacksonian Democrat.200 In 
1831, Jackson appointed him U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania, and in 1840, under President Martin Van Buren, he became 
Attorney General of the United States. This strange phenomenon of a 
highly elite Northern Jacksonian provided Tocqueville an important key 
to his view of democracy in America. 
According to Tocqueville’s notes, Gilpin expressed doubts about the 
jury as a judicial institution in terms similar to what Tocqueville later 
wrote in Democracy in America.201 But Tocqueville was more critical of 
the jury in that respect than Gilpin. Apparently Gilpin, like Livingston, 
referred to the jury as a school. Notwithstanding his Jacksonian politics, 
Gilpin seems to have believed that this school was effective because of the 
elite qualities of the teachers, lawyers, and judges: 
The jury is a school where the people come to learn their rights, 
where they come into contact with the most learned and 
enlightened of the upper classes, where the laws are taught in a 
practical way and one within the scope of their intelligence, by the 
most intelligent minds.202 
And Gilpin thought that, viewing the jury as a school, the civil jury was 
more important than the criminal.203 Civil cases affected interests 
throughout society, even more pervasively than criminal cases. 
Here was the germ of Tocqueville’s idea, the answer to his search for 
the aristocratic, moderating element in American society. 
3. The Judge as Teacher and Firm Guide 
The implications of the jury as a school are almost never fully aired. 
What are the benefits of this education? How is this education 
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accomplished? What does this rationale imply about the proper scope and 
practice of jury trial? And, dare we ask, what are its costs? 
In Democracy in America, Tocqueville largely ignored the question of 
costs. “A free school,” Tocqueville called the jury. But it was not free—
not to the jurors, the litigants, nor the legal system. He addressed the other 
three questions above, but many of the answers he gave differ sharply from 
the answers given today. Despite hundreds of quotations of Tocqueville 
on the jury as a school for democracy, his rationale for the jury is 
misunderstood. 
Tocqueville had no use for the argument often made today that what 
educates jurors is the act of deliberating with fellow jurors. According to 
this idea, jurors who deliberate together learn to listen to each other, to 
hear different points of view, and to continue to reason together to achieve 
a mutually agreeable outcome. Jury service therefore contributes to 
deliberative democracy.204 Proponents of this argument downplay the 
possibility that jurors might refuse to listen to each other, or be appalled at 
the incompetence and misguidedness of their fellows, or crudely 
compromise, or follow the leader. Tocqueville did not mention jurors 
learning from deliberations at all. Indeed, his discussion suggests that, 
without firm guidance from the judge, jury deliberations would be the 
blind leading the blind. 
In Tocqueville’s view, the key mechanisms for juror education were 
not deliberations, but rather the juror’s individual situation and the judge’s 
powerful guidance. Simply being put in the position of deciding a case 
encouraged a juror to respect the laws and to realize that he was 
responsible for his own acts. This was especially true in civil cases, as a 
citizen was more likely to be a civil litigant than a criminal defendant.205 
Such respect for the law and awareness of responsibility were essential in 
a democracy. With this argument, Tocqueville emphasized the liberal idea 
of individual responsibility. He also invoked civic republican ideas of the 
common good. By focusing on someone else’s dispute, a juror’s service 
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combatted “that individual selfishness which is like rust in society” and 
the particular danger of commercial democracies.206 
For Tocqueville, at least equally important was education from the 
contact that jurors had with “the best-educated and most-enlightened 
members of the upper classes.” These were the lawyers and especially the 
judge. These legal professionals taught the jurors “practical lessons in the 
law.”207 
In civil cases particularly, the judge provided that element of impartial, 
intelligent authority—an “aristocratic body”—without which democracy 
might descend into chaos. Criminal cases generally had simpler facts and 
more easily understandable law. So in criminal cases, jurors’ independent 
judgment could be more safely trusted.208 But in civil cases, jurors would 
often be at a loss without the judge. In civil cases, “the judge appears as a 
disinterested arbitrator between the litigants’ passions.” The jurors “feel 
confidence in him and listen to him with respect, for here his intelligence 
completely dominates theirs.”209 The judge cleared up confusion caused 
by testimony and by the arguments of counsel:  
It is he who unravels the various arguments they are finding it so 
hard to remember and takes them by the hand to guide them 
through procedural intricacies; it is he who limits their task to the 
question of fact and tells them what answer to give on questions 
of law.210  
The result was that the jurors rendered the decision made by the judge. 
“He has almost unlimited power over them.”211 
In other words, according to Tocqueville, a large part of the jurors’ 
education was to learn to defer to a more competent authority. 
Commentators on Tocqueville seldom mention, or perhaps notice, this 
point.212 The judge’s supposed dominance over the civil jury was why 
Tocqueville was not moved by arguments about the jury’s 
incompetence.213 Jurors could be educated, and at the same time outcomes 
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of cases would not suffer too greatly from the decisions of incompetent 
laypersons. 
For Americans, Tocqueville’s description of the judge dominating a 
civil jury is surprising, even shocking. That is not what happens today, and 
it was not what happened in many American courtrooms at the time 
Tocqueville was writing.214 Tocqueville exaggerated the power of the 
judge, and he downplayed the power of the lawyers. He left out the sway 
of lawyers’ rhetoric. His account softened the nature of the American 
adversarial system. 
In fact, Tocqueville’s account was accurate as a description of what 
happened in English courtrooms. By the nineteenth century, English 
judges had full independence. They enjoyed respect from the English legal 
profession and society at large for their integrity and competence. They 
had great powers to sum up and comment on evidence to the jury. English 
judges did indeed dominate civil jury verdicts. An editorial in The Times 
of London in 1850 suggested that 99 times out of 100, the verdict turned 
on the judge’s view rather than the jury’s, because the jury eagerly 
followed the judge. According to The Times, juries understood that the 
“judge advocates the cause of truth alone.”215 Not surprisingly, many 
persons in England thought that this judicial dominance was a good reason 
to get rid of civil juries. The process began with the County Courts Act of 
1846 and the Common Law Procedure Act of 1854. By 1965, the English 
civil jury had virtually disappeared.216 
But in America in the mid- and late-nineteenth century, as Tocqueville 
feared, judicial elections undermined respect for the judiciary. Judges were 
no longer fully independent. They could no longer exert the moderating 
influence that Montesquieu and Tocqueville had hoped. Under pressure 
from aggressive lawyers and concerned appellate judges, American trial 
judges began to lose their powers to comment on evidence.217 A weak 
judge could not guide jurors with authority. 
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Another difficulty with Tocqueville’s rationale is that it required 
jurors to sit in civil cases, and plenty of them. How else were jurors to reap 
the educational benefits? But serving as jurors in lots of civil cases was 
exactly what more and more Americans were reluctant to do. In a market 
economy, time is money. Americans increasingly wanted either to attend 
to their own affairs, or to discuss matters of general public interest. They 
did not want to waste time, as they saw it, deciding others’ individual 
business disputes.218 
E. American Transformation of Tocqueville’s Idea 
Despite these difficulties, the American press and legal profession 
soon picked up Tocqueville’s argument that the purpose of the jury was to 
educate jurors. In the process, they transformed the rationale to make it 
more palatable to democratic tastes. 
Already in 1838, just three years after the original publication of 
Democracy in America in Paris, a publisher in New York brought out an 
English translation of the first volume.219 This American edition contained 
the striking section on juries. 
After that, American periodicals and judicial opinions spread 
Tocqueville’s rationale with significant changes. The advent of New 
York’s Field Code of 1848 renewed American debate about the civil jury. 
In July 1848, the Monthly Law Reporter, a national periodical published 
in Boston, printed an article about New York’s new code. The author was 
the periodical’s 25-year-old editor, Stephen H. Phillips, a Massachusetts 
native who had graduated from Harvard College and studied at Harvard 
Law School under Joseph Story.220 
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Phillips eagerly propounded Tocqueville’s description of the civil jury 
as a school. But this school was not one of deference to the judge. Rather, 
a juror learned “to weigh facts, to balance arguments” for himself. 
Tocqueville did not praise such independent thinking of the juror in civil 
cases. And Phillips brought out the argument used so often today, which 
Tocqueville never mentioned: the juror learned the habit of deliberation 
with fellow jurors. This civic education improved his vote and turned a 
man into a citizen.221 
Phillips threw in another idea that Tocqueville had not mentioned. In 
Tocqueville’s view, the judge saved the jury from confusion. In Phillips’s 
view, the jury saved the judge from “isolation from the people.” That 
isolation was “the first step toward secret proceedings and arbitrary 
tribunals.” In other words, Phillips equated jury trial with public 
proceedings, as if proceedings could not be public without a jury. He 
praised the movement on the continent of Europe toward public trial by 
jury.222 But, significantly, continental Europeans used lay jurors almost 
exclusively in criminal cases. 
American judicial opinions soon took up the refrain, with another 
change. Only a few months later, Joseph Lumpkin, Chief Judge of the 
Georgia Supreme Court, writing an opinion on the right to civil jury trial, 
tracked Phillips’s argument almost exactly. He wrote that he and his 
colleagues cordially concurred in Phillips’s “glowing” praise of trial by 
jury. He gave all the rationales that Phillips gave, in the same language, 
especially the idea of the jury as a school for democracy. But there was a 
major difference. Phillips wrote in praise of the civil jury. Lumpkin wrote 
that these rationales applied only to criminal juries.223 Lumpkin moved 
even further from Tocqueville’s rationale, which applied mainly to civil 
juries. In fact, Lumpkin’s praise of the criminal jury followed by his attack 
on the civil jury closely tracked Alexander Hamilton’s arguments in The 
Federalist number 83. 
American commentators and judges thus conveniently lopped off 
Tocqueville’s bold assertions about judicial power and the importance of 
deference by jurors to judicial authority. Many of them also suppressed 
Tocqueville’s doubts about the jury as a judicial institution. Such open 
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doubts about the jury’s competence appeared unseemly at the peak of 
fervor for democracy, although in practice judges and legislators had 
begun to curtail jury power. After purging such uncomfortable points, 
American writers were happy to follow Tocqueville in calling the jury a 
“free school” for democracy. And so have American legal professionals 
ever since. 
CONCLUSION 
American experience suggests that Montesquieu was largely right that 
the jury acts as a mask for the power of the judiciary. The jury diverts 
responsibility and attention from the judges. Even though our system 
hardly holds jury trials anymore, the institution remains firmly planted in 
American minds as the standard way cases are resolved. American judges, 
both state and federal, are uniform in their glowing praise for the jury 
system (at least in public). Nary a peep is heard from them about the 
weaknesses of the jury. The judges have good professional reasons. This 
judicial praise for the jury takes on an even more exaggerated quality as 
judges assert ever greater power over the law and the other two branches 
of government. The boldness of the American judiciary today is far from 
the quiet, moderating influence that Montesquieu recommended. But 
arguably the current American judicial power is the descendant of his 
ideas. 
Central to Montesquieu’s and Tocqueville’s notions of judges as the 
guardians of liberty is judicial independence. The American federal 
judiciary and that of some states are largely independent, free from 
concern about their continued tenure in office. But judicial elections, as 
Tocqueville feared, have undermined independence. As is well known, in 
some judicial campaigns today vast contributions are collected from 
interested parties. The donors expect that their contributions will have an 
effect, and generally, they are not disappointed. 
Meanwhile, the Anti-Federalists have proved correct in many of their 
predictions about the federal judiciary. Appointed judges can be intensely 
willful and disregard prudent limitations on judicial power. There is, 
indeed, no control on them. 
I think it fair to suggest that the use of juries in America has deflected 
attention from the need to clean up and to restrain the judiciary. Americans 
often pay too little attention to the integrity and competence of the state 
judiciaries, and the jury is one of the reasons. The U.S. Supreme Court is, 
predictably and inevitably, given our constitutional arrangements, the 
focus of fierce political controversy. But the lower federal courts, 
especially U.S. district judges, exercise considerable power with little 




oversight and less public knowledge. In this respect, Montesquieu’s idea 
of the jury acting as a mask for the judiciary may have backfired. The jury 
may act as a mask indeed, but for judicial corruption, incompetence, or 
willfulness. Americans might comfort themselves with the notion that the 
jury is acting as a backstop, but that is a false hope. 
This Article points to some of the drawbacks of juries. Both 
Montesquieu and Tocqueville, as judges in an inquisitorial system, were 
attuned to this issue. Both recognized considerable weaknesses in the use 
of lay jurors. They counted on the influence of the judge to guide the jury 
to an appropriate decision.  
But Montesquieu and Tocqueville did not anticipate the continued 
pressure of the adversarial system. Lawyers in the American adversarial 
system, especially, have worked hard to diminish the informal power of 
the judge over the jury. Today, for example, it is unthinkable that an 
American judge would comment on the evidence to the jury. John 
Wigmore wrote that this one change had done more than anything else to 
undermine the accuracy of jury trial.224 Juries are now at the mercy of 
opposing counsel, with no buffer. The unpredictability of verdicts, 
particularly as to damages, has caused rates of jury trial to plummet.225 
Today, of federal civil cases reaching disposition after court action, jury 
trial occurred in 0.65%.226 Despite civil jury trial rates of less than 1%, the 
jury still affects outcomes. Settlement negotiations occur “in the shadow 
of the jury,” trying to anticipate what a jury would do.227 
Montesquieu and Tocqueville presupposed two important conditions 
for the use of juries: competent judges of integrity and the ability of those 
judges to guide and advise jurors. In the United States, those conditions no 
 
 224. 9 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM 
OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2551, at 504–505 (3d ed. 1940). 
 225. In a 2016 survey, 936 lawyers gave as their top three reasons why jury-
eligible cases did not go to jury trial: (1) “Parties reached a mutually agreeable 
settlement”; (2) “Uncertainty of jury decision-making on damages”; and (3) 
“Uncertainty of jury decision-making on liability.” AMERICAN SOCIETY OF TRIAL 
CONSULTANTS & THE CIVIL JURY PROJECT AT NYU SCHOOL OF LAW, 2016 
ATTORNEY SURVEY: DECLINING CIVIL JURY TRIALS 16 (Dec. 2016), 
https://civiljuryproject.law.nyu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/ASTC-CJP-
Attorney-Survey-Report-2016.pdf. 
 226. Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics: March 31, 2019 (Table C-4), 
ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/federal-judicial-caseload-
statistics-2019-tables (1,645 civil jury trials out of 251,441 total dispositions after 
court action). 
 227. J.J. Prescott & Kathryn E. Spier, A Comprehensive Theory of Civil 
Settlement, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 59, 68–80 (2016). 




longer apply. At least in civil cases, it may be time to drop the mask. This 
society should see clearly what kind of judges it has, and their powers. 
 
